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The Ghana Free Zone Act
Kofi Oteng Kufuor
INTRODUCTION
This Article analyzes the Ghana Free Zone Act (FZA),1 the Act of Parliament
that gives effect to the Ghana free zone program.2 The FZA replaces the Industrial
Free Zones Authority Decree (IFZAD)3 and has been enacted at a time of economic
change in Ghana. The main feature of this change has been the shift from the con-
siderable emphasis on central planning of economic policy towards market forces
and its sequential implications for trade liberalization.
The goals of economic reform were set out in the Economic Recovery Pro-
gramme (ERP) for Ghana.4 As part of the ERP, there have been major changes in
Ghana's trade policy. It now entails restoring incentives for the production of food,
industrial raw materials and export commodities, and thereby increases output to
realistic levels. It also involves increasing the availability of essential consumer
goods, machinery and equipment, and improving the distribution system. Further-
more, it entails increasing the overall availability of foreign exchange, improving its
allocative mechanism, and channeling it into selected high priority areas.5 Moreover,
there has been a progressive phasing-out of foreign exchange restrictions culminating
in the introduction of a market-based regime. Ghana's tariff structure has also been
rationalized to provide for a relatively uniform and moderate level of protection with
* BA University of Science and Technology, Ghana; LL.M., London School of Economics. Law Lecturer
University of East London. I am grateful for the assistance given to me by officials at the Ministry of Trade and
Industry in Ghana during the preparation of this article.
1. Act 504, Free Zone Act, 1995 (Ghana) [hereinafter FZA].
2. INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IRELAND, FEASIBILTY STUDY FORTHEESTABLISHMENT OF AN EXPORT
PROCESSING ZONE IN GHANA, DRAFr FINAL REPORT, (July 1994) (containing the objectives of the program)
[hereinafter FEASMILITY REPORT].
3. Supreme Military Council Decree 157, Ghana Industrial Free Zone Authority Decree, 1978 [hereinafter
IFZAD].
4. ECONOMIC RECOVERY PROGRAMME, 1984-86, REPORTPREPARED BYTHE GOVERNMENT OF GHANA FOR
THE SECOND MEETING OF THE CONSULTATIVE GROUP FOR GHANA, Paris, Dec. 1984 (1994) [hereinafter ERP].
5. 1 TRADE POLICY REVIEW, GHANA (1992) [hereinafter TRADE POLICY REVIEW]. The formulators of the
ERP, noted that empirical studies on foreign trade regimes in developing countries have concluded that successful
trade liberalization normally produces the following benefits: proper resource allocation; improved export earnings
which tends to ease excess capacity and lead to elimination of serious bottlenecks; a substantial inflow of foreign
capital; the production of goods for sale to international markets rather than to a sheltered domestic market may
also exert pressures on domestic firms to improve their efficiency in the use of resources; larger market size for
domestic firms as they are now free to further penetrate foreign markets; and the freeing up of the administrative
machinery also reduces the costs to domestic firms while enabling the Government to use its scarce managerial
resources for more strategic objectives. See ERP, supra note 4, at 69.
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duty rates ranging between 0-25%.6 In addition, the Imports and Exports Act with
its restrictive provisions on the ownership of the proceeds of the sale of exported
goods has been repealed and replaced with the 1995 Export and Import Act which
makes no mention of government control over exporter's foreign exchange earnings.7
In addition, the ERP has entailed reforms to Ghana's investment legislation.
These reforms included the 1985 Investment Code.8 This Code stated it was essential
to encourage investment in the Ghanaian economy to facilitate increased productivity
for national development and to enable the exploitation of Ghana's natural resources,
to promote effective employment and the development of skills and technology for
national development Hence although the 1985 Code did still prohibit the parti-
cipation of foreign capital in certain areas of the economy,' it was indicative of the
emerging tendency towards economic liberalism.
Further measures to open up the Ghanaian economy to foreign capital were
adopted under the 1994 Ghana Investment Promotion Centre Act.'2 Essentially this
Act reduced the sectors of the economy reserved for Ghanaians. 3 Furthermore, the
minimum capital requirement for foreign investors wishing to enter into joint ven-
tures with domestic entrepreneurs was reduced from sixty thousand dollars under the
1985 Investment Code 4 to ten thousand dollars or its equivalent in capital goods.'5
In circumstances where the enterprise is completely owned by a non-Ghanaian there
was a minimum requirement of one hundred thousand dollars under the 1985 Invest-
ment Code1 6 but this has been reduced to not less than fifty thousand dollars or its
equivalent value in capital goods by way of equity capital. 7
It is in the context of this re-design of Ghana's trade and investment policy and
law that the FZA has been enacted. Accordingly, Part I of this Article describes the
main types of free economic zones that exist. Part II gives an overview of the main
policy arguments supporting the creation of free zones focusing on the supposed
advantages (and disadvantages) for developing countries. Part III begins an analysis
of the provisions of the FZA. It discusses the scope of permitted economic activity
in, and the administration of the proposed free zones. Part IV examines the rules for
the provision of licenses for developers and enterprises. Part V analyzes the incen-
6. Samuel Paul, Private Sector Assessment: A Pilot Assessment In Ghana, THE PUBLIC, PLANNING, AND
RESEARCH COMPLEX 35-36 (1989) [hereinafter Paul, Private Sector Assessment].
7. Act 503, The Export and Import Act, 1995 (Ghana).
8. P.N.D.C. Law 116, 1985 (Ghana).
9. Id. Preamble, para. (2).
10. Id. art. 16 and the Schedule to the Code.
11. See Ken Laryea, Recent Investment Legislation in Ghana, 39 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 197 (1990) (analyzing
some of the salient provisions of the 1985 Investment Code).
12. Act 478, The Ghana Investment Promotion Centre Act, 1994 (Ghana).
13. Id. art. 18(1) and the Schedule to the Act.
14. P.N.D.C. supra note 8, art. 21(1).
15. Id. art. 19(2)(a).
16. Id. art. 21(1).
17. Id. art. 19(2)(b).
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fives under the FZA, and part VI discusses the legal framework for exports and
imports out of, and into the zones. Part VII examines the implications of the labor
provisions of the FZA, while part VIII examines the framework for the resolution of
disputes. The concluding part, part IX, puts forward some suggestions for future
research and discussion. Although this article is not a comparative one, inevitably
there is a focus on the contrast between the FZA and its predecessor the IFZAD.
I. CATEGORIES OF FREE ECONOMIC ZONES
Various definitions of a free economic zone exist. For example, Grubel states
that a free economic zone is a geographically defined area where certain types of
economic activity take place without some of the government taxation and regulation
that applies to them in the rest of the economy.'8 Another definition is that it is an
isolated, enclosed and policed area, operated as a public utility, in or adjacent to a
port of entry, furnished with facilities for lading, unlading, handling, storing and for
reshipping products by land, water or air.' 9 A further definition is that a free zone is
an area where enterprises are treated with more preference than in other areas to
attract foreign capital and modem technology' They have also been defined as a
customs-privileged area conceived in order to attract foreign private capital.'
Common to virtually all the definitions are the following characteristics. The
market mechanism rather than the State allocates resources and sets prices. Economic
activities of zones are regulated by market forces bringing into full play the functions
of economic factors such as prices, wages, costs, profits, taxes, exchange and
interests rates. Even in countries which in the past had, centrally-planned economies,
the importance of the market mechanism was, and is, the fundamental difference
between the zone economy and that of the other parts of the country. "
Further, foreign capital is the most important source of funds for establishing and
developing a free zone. The contribution a zone can make to the national economy
is determined mainly by its success in attracting foreign capital, foreign technology
and foreign management skills that can be useful in developing local businesses and
in building infrastructure.23 Moreover, the products of free zones are mainly for
18. Herbert G. Grubel, Free Economic Zones: Good or Bad?, 39 AUSSENWIRTSCHAFr 43 (1990) [hereinafter
Grubel, Free Economic Zones].
19. THE IMPLICATIONS OF FOREIGN-TRADE ZONES FOR U.S. INDUSTRIES AND FOR COMPErITVE CONDITIONS
BETWEEN U.S. AND FOREIGN FIRMS: REPORT To THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, ON INVESTIGATION NO. 332-248 UNDER SECTION 332(g) OFTHE TARIFF ACT OF 1930, USITC
Publication 2059, Feb. 1988, 1 [hereinafter USITC, THE IMPLICATIONS OF FOREIGN-TRADE ZONES FOR U.S.
INDUSTRIES].
20. Herold Jerome Gross, Special Economic Zones, IV CHINA LAW RPTR. 23 (1988).
21. United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations, THE CHALLENGE OF FREE ECONOMIC ZONES IN
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 1 (1991) [hereinafter UNCTC, THE CHALLENGE OF FREE ECONOMIC ZONES].
22. Id. at 155.
23. Id.
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export. The success of a free zone largely depends on how well its products perform
on the international market.2
A free zone is also normally considered to be outside the national customs
territory for purposes of the tariff laws, but still subject to other laws applicable in
the public interest, health, and safety. Since the area within the zone is foreign
territory, goods entering the zone are not subject to formal customs entry require-
ments.2s
Historically, the first type of free economic zone 6 was the commercially-based
free ports that were mainly engaged in a restricted range of commercial activities
such as the transhipment, storage, packaging and re-export of goods. These zones
removed the requirements of normally complex customs procedures that act as
barriers to the flow of goods. After the Second World War a new genre of free zones
began to emerge. The commercially-based free ports were now being replaced by
manufacturing-oriented zones. These zones were mainly a result of developing
countries trying to attract foreign capital and to promote their exports. In response
to this, multinational companies in western industrial countries moved mobile and
surplus capital to low cost production sites in developing countries. As a result,
between the late 1950's and the mid-1960's the first economic zones combining trade
and manufacturing functions began to emerge.27 Since the 1970's the concept of free
economic zones has further developed. This evolution has been in the form of a shift
from the manufacturing-oriented export processing zone to the more comprehensive
type of zone which is more broadened and balanced among sectors of the economy
and covers larger areas.2
With regard to the governance of free zones, the following models can be
distinguished: the organizational model; the administrative model; and the integrated
model. Under the organizational model, non-profit, private, public, or joint private-
public companies in a zone are responsible for the supply of the essential infra-
24. Id.
25. UsrTC, THE IMPLICATIONS OF FOREIGN TRADE ZONES FOR U.S. INDUSTRIES, supra note 19, at 1.
26. The nomenclature for free economic zones is quite diverse and the following are used interchangeably
in scholarly works on free economic zones: Customs Zone, Customs Free Zone, Duty Free Export-Processing Zone,
Export Free Zone, Export Processing Free Zone, Export Processing Zone, Foreign Trade Zone, Free Economic
Zone, Free Export Processing Zone, Free Production Zone, Free Trade Zone, Free Zone, Industrial Export
Processing Zone, Joint Enterprise Zone, Maquiladora, Privileged Export Zone, Tax Free Trade Zone, Tax Free
Zone and Zone of Joint Entrepreneurship. See UNCTC, THE CHALLENGE OF FREE ECONOMIC ZONES, supra note
21, at 3. Throughout this paper I use terms such as "Free economic Zones," "Free Zone," or "Zone."
27. Xiangming Chen, The Evolution of Free Economic Zones and the Recent Development of Cross
National Growth Zones, 19 INT'L J. OF URBAN & REGIONAL RESEARCH 593, 600 (1995) [hereinafter Chen, The
Evolution of Free Economic Zones].
28. IA Under the above outlined types of free economic zones, three sub-categories of free economic zones
exist. First there is the free trade zone. Its main attribute is that the host-country's excise taxes and other foreign
trade constraints do not apply to traffic in and out of the zones and to activities within it. The second category are
the free economic zones devoted to special service industries. The third sub-category are the urban enterprise zones
located in urban areas. See Graubel, Free Economic Zones, supra note 18, at 44-46.
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structure. They also undertake to organize economic activities and provide necessary
logistic services.
29
On the other hand, the management of a zone using the administrative model
relies on local administrative units to manage economic, trade and industrial affairs
in a zone on behalf of the higher-level authorities or through local ports and customs
authorities directly.30 The third model, the integrated model, is an combination of the
administrative and organizational models. The main managerial feature of this model
is a division of labor among a zone's financier, administrator, business manager and
service coordinator, all of whom are subject to government regulation. Under this
model, the local government may subcontract the organization and management of
the zone's activities to a private firm.31 A recent modification of the integrated model
is the development of parastatal business agencies that centralize and execute all the
functions in running a zone. 2
II. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST FREE ECONOMIC ZONES
Basically, free economic zones are established because of the presumption that
the benefits associated with their creation will outweigh any potential costs. En-
couraged by the success of the Newly Industrialized Countries of South-East Asia
and their policy of open markets, most developing countries have begun to shift from
import-substitution to export-led trade policies. One dimension of this has been the
establishment of special economic zones for such economic activity as export pro-
motion or.industrial development?
3
Another rationale for free zones is premised on the need for debt servicing. In
the 1980's debt servicing became a major constraint on the balance of payments of
developing countries. Policy responses by developing countries to this problem have
included reducing foreign exchange expenditure, attracting fresh foreign capital, and
increasing foreign currency earnings through exports. It is argued that free zones help
to achieve these objectives.?
Free zones can also be used as a laboratory for experimenting with free market
policies, which is another reason for their establishment. Experience, it is held, has
shown that free zones can serve as modernizing influences especially in developing
countries through the visibility of the zone. As a result of its originality, economic
activity in a zone is observed very closely by the local community and local in-




33. Jose Daniel Amado, Free Industrial Zones: Law and Industrial Development in the New International
Division of Labour, 11 U. OF PA J. OF INT'L BUS. L. 81, 94-95 (1989) [hereinafter Amado, Free Industrial Zones].
34. Id. at 95-96.
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dustries. Such study normally engenders learning effects outside the zone especially
in management techniques, and the organization of work or export marketing?5
Another impact on domestic firms results from the close physical and social
contact with foreign firms. This contact can generate substantial inter-firm communi-
cation. The result is that this almost inevitably tends to bring those domestic enter-
prises closer to the technological and managerial levels of the foreign firms. Another
learning channel is through the process of inter-firm migration of technicians,
foremen, workers and middle-level managers. While quantitatively, such inter-firm
migration may not be that important; it is argued that qualitatively such a process can
be very significant. Zone-trained managers or overseers working for a local
enterprise outside the zone can make a big difference to a firm's performance.
3 6
Free economic zones also play an important part in the evolution of the new
international division of labor. The new international division of labor involves the
relocation of certain industries, primarily labor-intensive industries, from developed
countries to the developing world. This is done either through sub-contracting
arrangements or by setting up local branches of their own operations?7 There is a
positive contribution here. The result is that international production contributes to
employment opportunities, mainly in developing countries, through higher allocative
efficiency, the strengthening of competitiveness and increased opportunities for
output growth.38
An additional benefit of free zones is that there may be economies of scale in the
development of land and in the provision of common services and utilities. In cir-
cumstances where basic infrastructure and utilities are in limited supply, especially
in developing countries, significant economies can be gained from concentrating new
developments in a smaller area.39 There also may be external economies of agglo-
meration by having similar industries grouped together.40
With particular regard to urban enterprise zones, proponents assert they will
produce a sense of empowerment and commitment and will give residents a stake in
their communities. The argument is that tax breaks will bring businesses to the inner
cities, produce jobs, revitalize neighborhoods, and create stability. Thus, urban enter-
prise zones will revitalize economically and physically distressed areas, primarily by
encouraging the formation of new businesses and the retention and expansion of
existing businesses. They not only will stimulate the creation of new jobs in the
enterprise zones, particularly for disadvantaged workers and long-term unemployed
individuals, but will also enhance the availability and delivery of local goods and
35. See UNCTC, THE CHALLENGE OFFREE ECONOMIC ZONES, supra note 21, at 8.
36. Id.
37. See James H. Mittleman, Rethinking the International Division of Labour in the Context of Globali-
zation, 16 THIRD WORLD Q. 273 (1995).
38. See UNCTAD, WORLD INVEST'MENTREPORt at 210, U.N. Sales No. E.94.A.14 (1994).
39. See David Wall, China's Economic Reform and Opening-Up Process: The Role of the Special Economic
Zones, 11 DEv. POL'Y REa. 243,248 (1993).
40. Id.
250
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services to residents and businesses in the enterprise zones, and promote
revitalization of the enterprise zones through meaningful entrepreneurial activity."
However, the concept of special economic zones has been criticized on a number
of grounds. The thrust of this criticism is that free economic zones do not have any
real value for developing countries because they do not transform the asymmetric
nature of the north-south economic relationship. Instead, free zones only reproduce
world patterns of underdevelopment on a smaller scale. The following arguments are
used to illustrate and reinforce this position:
First, free zone skeptics contend that most zones employ mainly low skilled
workers with lax labour codes and health and safety standards. Thus, there is no
transfer of high-level technical knowledge to the host country's workers employed
in a free zone. The impact of a weak regime on the protection of workers health and
safety is illustrated by the conditions of workers in a number of free zones in Asia.
One commentator has noted, in this regard, that free zones almost exclusively
seem to concentrate their recruitment on young, unmarried females from social
groups or geographical areas where this category of worker is plentiful. The advan-
tage being that these recruits are normally submissive and thus most unlikely to
question the nature of their working conditions. Furthermore, female zone-workers
can quite easily be made to withdraw from the labor market after a few years work
as they tend to get married and have children or when their health begins to
deteriorate. Added to this is the availability of a fresh supply of recruits on demand.
Consequently, these factors serve to prevent trade unions from being formed in the
free zones thus opening up the workforce for unfair exploitation by zone enter-
prises.42 Moreover, zone enterprises commonly hire such women on apprenticeship
contracts for protracted periods at lower pay rates and with less fringe benefits than
permanent workers. This practice depresses zone wages below official minimum
levels, and keeps the affected workers in a continuing state of insecurity. Addi-
tionally, because they are unskilled, promotion prospects for the majority of workers
in free zones are usually minimal.43
Another problem with the free zones is that one of their supposed advantages,
the generation of employment through the attraction of foreign firms, has its
limitations, in terms of the kinds of jobs generated and the long-term sustainability
of these jobs. Production in most free zones has centered either in textiles and
garments or in electrical or electronic products. This implies that the attraction of
low-cost labor, even when reinforced by other incentives, is confined to Foreign
Direct Investment in a limited group of countries."
41. See Ellen P. Aprill, Caution: Enterprise Zones, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1341 (1993).
42. See Gus Edgren, Spearheads of Industrialization or Sweatshops in the Sun?, in EXPORT PROCESSING
ZONES AND INDUSTRIAL EMPLOYMENT IN ASIA: PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS OFA TECHNICAL WORKSHOP 27,32-35
(1984) (Eddy Lee ed. 1984) [hereinafter Edgren, Spearheads ofIndustrialization].
43. Id. at 34.
44. See UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENTREPORT, supra note 38, at 191.
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The value of tax incentives granted to firms operating in free zones is also
debatable. It is not certain if tax incentives are an important factor in determining
whether firms will relocate their activities into free zones. Therefore, the revenue
forgone and social cost incurred in establishing free zones could be an extravagant
exercise and a burden on the tax payer, especially in developing countries. Some
research has called into question the importance of tax incentives by suggesting three
major factors influence such a decision: transportation costs between the firm in a
zone, its suppliers and customers; input costs such as labor and land; and economies
and dis-economies of agglomeration which are a function of the amount of an
activity clustered in one particular area. Incentives were regarded as either ineffective
or harmful. Moreover, tax incentives may have been given to zone enterprises in
order to locate in a particular area, or expand operations without such assistance.45
As far as zone-host economy backward linkages are concerned, there is normally
very little technology transfer from free zones to the host country. Thus, free zones
increase the technological dependence of the host country. This is because research
and development are not transferred to the host country from firms that operate in
free zones. This is not surprising for there is normally no incentive for zone operators
to do this as technology transfer will only enable local firms to compete more
efficiently with them. Also, free economic zones contribute to the overall outflow
of capital to the home countries of foreign investors. Therefore, zones are only
instruments of the interests of international capital and consequently fail to promote
genuine national development.47
The claim that free economic zones provide an impetus for the export drive of
developing countries is also refuted. Arguably, there is a marked difference between
apparent export and real export. For instance, in cases where the majority of the
occupant firms in a free zone are foreign firms producing 100 percent for export, to
enable these firms to operate their factcries, raw materials or semi-finished products
are brought in from outside of the host country, from the host country itself, or from
both sources. The importers and exporters involved are not infrequently different
branches of the same foreign firm. Whenever the raw materials or semi-finished
products come in, they are registered as imports of the home country, then they are
processed for export. The movement of the products across the host country's border
out to another zone or country is registered as the host country's export.
4 8
The whole process represents a movement of goods occurring in one and the
same corporate territory combining various enclaves. Thus, the counting of the
45. See Jennifer L. Gilbert, Selling the City Without Selling Out: New Legislation on Development Incentives
Emphasizes Accountability, 27 TnE URBAN LAW. 427, 432-436 (1995).
46. See Voxi Heinrich S. Amavilah, The Political Economy of Export Processing Zones (EPZs) in
Developing Countries, 17 NAT. RESOURcES F. 273, 279-280 (1993).
47. See GEORGE T. CRANE, THE POLrICAL ECONOMY OF CHINA'S SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES 11 (1990).
48. See Muto Ichiyo, The Free Trade Zone and Mystique of Export-Oriented Industrialization, 8-9 AMPO:
JAPAN-ASIA Q. REv. 9,23 (1977).
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volume and value of the goods is purely nominal with regard to the host country.
Nowhere in these links do the goods come off the parent company's own channel.
Nor are the production process, rhythm, and also the style of business subject to
control by the host countries. Yet this process, apparently alien to the host country's,
is formalistically and statistically registered as the host country's import, manu-
facture, and export.49
In sum, there is no place in this kind of chain of performances where the host
country (its government or its businessmen, to say nothing of its workers) can
intervene. The investing foreign corporation decides that to make, the volume of
production, and to whom to sell based on its profits. The economic surplus generated
by the host country's labor belongs to the same corporation. Free zones epitomize
this type of export-import transaction. Thus, while it may be an exaggeration to say
that the free zone type of export is not export at all, it must at least be said that the
concept of export has been grossly disfigured and that from the point of view of the
"exporting and importing country" this process represents no more than "apparent
import" or "apparent export.
50
With particular reference to the supposed beneficial impact of special economic
zones in urban areas, critics of such schemes argue that inner cities face problems
relating to education, health care, crime transportation and a deteriorating infra-
structure. Urban enterprise zones can do little to address these problems. Thus, such
programs should not be seen as the centerpiece of a nation's urban policy. 
5
I. ECONOMIC ACTIvTY AND ADMINISTRATION UNDER THE FZA
In a broadening of economic activity that can be pursued in the free. zones, the
FZA expands upon the scope of economic enterprise that was permitted under the
IFZAD. In addition to storage and manufacture of goods, the FZA allows economic
operators in the zones to provide services as well.52 This shift is evidence of Ghana's
commitment to wider economic liberalization as set out in the ERP, and presumably
it also reflects recognition by the Ghanaian authorities of the importance of services
in total economic activity.
To establish a free zone under the FZA, the President, on the recommendation
of the Free Zones Board, may declare any area of land or building as a free zone or
any airport, river port, sea port or lake port as a free port. Such a declaration shall
specify the area and scope of activities to be carried out in the zone concerned s4
49. Id.
50. Id. at 24-25.
51. See Aprill, Caution: Enterprise Zones, supra note 41, at 1346.
52. FZA, supra note I, art. 13(1)(a)-(d).
53. Under the FZA, a free zone means an area or building declared as a free zone by publication in the
Commercial and Industrial Bulletin and includes single factory zones, free port, free airport, free river, or lake port.
Id. art. 43(1).
54. Id. art. 7(l)(a)-(b).
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This provision, as recommended by the Feasibility Report, does not designate
any specific area as a free zone. Thus, it allows for flexibility in terms of activity,
location, and size of any zones created under the FZA. However, a number of areas
have already been deemed potential sites for the first free zones. These are Accra (the
Ring Road Industrial Areas, 5 North Adenta s the Tema Motorway Industrial Area),58
Tema,59 and Sekondi-Takoradi. 6'
The design of a framework of an organization to administer the zones resulted
in the consideration of the following options. The first was whether the private sector
should play a major role in the development of the free zones. In such an instance
there would be no free zone development organization. The Minister for Trade and
Industry in this instance would have responsibility for control and development of
free zones while an export and investment promotional agency would promote the
concept.6' However, the private sector's lack of finance and expertise rendered such
an approach unfeasible.62
A second option that was considered was the possible creation of a strong
authority with development and regulatory powers including the power to develop
and manage the free zones. However, here, it was determined that it might be diffi-
cult to separate the control function of the organization from its commercial role.
Thus, there was the possibility of developing non-viable or non-commercial zones
in these circumstances. 63
The third option was the establishment of a free zone authority under the
Minister for Trade and Industry. This authority would have regulatory powers but
would be precluded from developing and managing any of the free zones. This
option, however, was rejected because, as was the case with the first option, it
entailed considerable private sector input into the development and management of
the free zones. The view was held that this approach might not succeed due to the
constraints on the private sector.64
55. See FEASIBILrTY REPORT, supra note 2, at 61. One caveat here was that although the legislation should
be flexible, it should not follow that free zones be established on a large scale immediately. What should be done
is that particular areas should be declared as free zones only after a proper feasibility study has been conducted.
Moreover, there must be a clear indication that private investors will support the project and also a site should be
acquired which can be developed at moderate cost without incurring major off site infrastructure costs. Id. at 61-62.
56. Id. at 69.
57. Id. at 71.
58. Id. at 72.
59. Id. at 72-73.
60. Id. at 73-74.
61. Id. at 83, 85.
62. Id. at 84.
63. Id. at 85-86.
64. Id.
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A fourth possibility was the designation of an existing organization, either the
Ghana Export Promotion Council65 or the Ghana Investment Promotion Centre,66 as
the administrative arm of the zones. This was, however, rejected by these two
organizations as well as the private sector.6 7
The final framework of the powers granted to the institution created to manage
the free zones was a combination of the options that were considered. It is mainly an
institution with considerable autonomy and is charged primarily with the respon-
sibility of selecting zone locations and assisting with the development of the zones.
Specifically, the FZA states that a Free Zones Board (the Board) is to be estab-
lished. 8 The Board is to consist of a Chairman, who shall be the Minister of Trade
and Industry, and eight other persons, four of whom shall be appointed from the
private sector. 9 The members of the Board are to be appointed by the President in
consultation with the Council of State.
0 The Board is also to have a Secretariat
71
with the Minister for Trade and Industry being granted the power to assign to the
Secretariat such public officers that the Board may need for the implementation of
its functions. 72 The functions of the Secretariat are to be set out in a legislative
instrument.7
Thus, presumably, to include a wide-range of persons with the necessary policy-
making knowledge, the FZA has changed the composition of the administrative arm
of the zones from what was provided for under the IFZAD. Arguably, this is because
the Authority under the IFZAD was more of an organ of the State. It included
persons in their capacity as representatives of particular Government departments
with presumably, secondary consideration for their expertise and capabilities.
65. The Ghana Export Promotion Council is an autonomous institution that is responsible for promoting
exports of non-traditional products. It has a Board of Directors that consists of three members from the public sector
and four from private enterprises. See TRADE PouCY REVtEw, supra note 5, at 28.
66. Id. The Ghana Investment Promotion Centre is established under Article I(1) of the Ghana Investment
Promotion Centre Act, Act 478, (1994).
67. See FEASIBiLrY REPORT, supra note 2, at 86.
68. FZA, supra note 1, art. 1(I).
69. Id. art. 2(l)(a)-(b). This inclusion of representatives from the private sector, coupled with the transition
to parliamentary democracy, is consistent with attempts to democratize trade policy formulation in Ghana. The
private sector participates in trade policy-making through a series of formal and informal high level meetings
between the Government members and officials, such as the Secretary for Trade and Tourism, and various private
sector representatives. The interests of private producers are represented by bodies such as the Ghana Association
of Manufacturers and the Ghana National Chamber of Commerce. A Government "Think Tank" on Private Sector
Development Issues, comprising Government and private sector representatives was established in 1988 to provide
an input into the ERP. Following its recommendations, the Government introduced in the same year the practice
of bi-annual high level meetings and Government-private-sector meetings. The Ghana Investments Centre has also
established Consultative Committee on Private Sector Development to facilitate regular interaction with the private
sector. See TRADE PoLicY REVIEW, supra note 5, at 28-29.
70. FLA, supra note I, art. 2(2). The Council of State is an advisory and consultative body established under
Article 89(1) of the 1992 Ghanalan Constitution.
71. Id. art. 36(l).
72. Id. art. 36(2).
73. Id. art. 36(3).
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Furthermore, there was no specific provision for participation in policy-making and
analysis by the private sector.74
The obligations of the Board are: the grant of licenses to applicants under the
FZA;75 it is to help applicants for licenses by providing services for obtaining other
relevant licenses permits and facilities; 76 scrutinizing and recommending agreements
and treaties relating to the development and activities of the zones for approval?
7
Further, the Board is under a duty: to monitor the activities, performance and
development of free zone developers and enterprises;78 to ensure compliance by free
zone developers and enterprises with the provisions of the FZA and any other laws
relevant to free zone activities;79 to register and keep records and data on the pro-
grams of developers, operators, and enterprises in free zones;' and performing such
other functions as are incidental to the foregoing!'
Therefore, the Board has largely been freed from the obligations that the
Authority had under the IFZAD, such as establishing and managing industrial zones,
providing the necessary services for the manufacture of goods for export, providing
infrastructure required for the proper and effective functioning of industrial zones,
providing warehousing services, collecting fees and dealing directly with labor
activities and industrial and commercial affairs
8 2
With regard to the development of a free zone, developers, subject to the
Constitution, can acquire land within the area declared for the purpose of carrying
out any permitted form of economic activity. 83 They can also lease or sub-lease real
property they own, or have leased, or have the right to use, sell, or lease. The
developer may also sell or rent buildings to free zone enterprises? 4 The FZA, how-
ever, shifts responsibility for the construction of buildings5 and the provision of
infrastructure and services from the State to the free zone developers.
8 6
IV. LICENSING
Initial licensing proposals put forward suggested that the Ministry of Trade and
Industry should be responsible for receiving and evaluating licensing applications.
It was recommended that the Ministry establish a section for this purpose. Also, the
74. IFZAD. supra note 3, art. 5(1).
75. FZA, supra note 1, art. 3(a).
76. Id. art. 3(1)(b).
77. Id. art. 3(1)(c).
78. Id. art. 3()(d).
79. Id. art. 3(1)(e).
80. Id. art. 3)(O.
81. Id. art. 3(1)(g).
82. IFZAD, supra note 3, art. 3(1)(a)-(j).
83. Id. art. 9(1)(a).
84. Id. arL 9(1)(b).
85. Free Zone Regulations, 1996, L.I. 1618. Regulation 7(1) and (2).
86. FZA, supra note 1, art. 9(2)(a)-(f).
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Ministry was to establish a committee which comprised the Ministries of Finance
(Customs), Employment and Welfare, Environment, and the Central Bank to advise
on whether or not special conditions need to be attached to a particular license.87
However, on the face of it, this procedure had a potential shortcoming: it could allow
for the politicization of the licensing process. The Ministry of Trade is a government
department and is not insulated from everyday politics. Thus, there was always the
possibility of political considerations overriding economic benefit in the grant of
licenses.
Accordingly, under the FZA, an application for a license to develop, manage, or
establish an enterprise in a free zone is to be made in writing 8 and to be submitted
only to the Secretariat of the Board. 89 The application should specify the zone to be
developed or managed or both, or the trade, business, or industry for which the
licence is required,90 as well as any additional information that the Board may
require.9 The Board is under an obligation to respond to the application within
twenty-eight working days from the receipt of the application92 and a licensed
developer shall commence development activities within six months of receipt of a
licence.
93
In granting a licence, the Board may authorize the development, or management,
or both, of a free zone,94 or the carrying on of a trade, business, or industry within the
zone.95 The provisos to the licensing clauses are that persons wishing to carry on a
trade, business, or industry with a free zone should be registered as a body corporate
under the 1963 Companies Code, Act 179,96 or a partnership registered under the
1962 Private Partnership Act, Act 152.97 Furthermore, no licence shall be granted for
the provision of banking services in a free zone unless the applicant is also registered
and licensed under the Banking Law of 1989, PNDC Law 225.98 Additionally, no
insurance services can be provided by an enterprise in a free zone unless the
enterprise is registered under the Insurance Law of 1989, PNDC Law 227 9
The Board also has the power to attach to any license it issues conditions that it
thinks appropriate. These include conditions regarding employment skills, develop-
ment, impact on the environment, creation of job opportunities, and degree of export
orientation. The Board can revoke a licence whenever it is satisfied that the licensee
87. See FEAsmILrrTY REPORT, supra note 2, at 87.
88. FZA, supra note 1, art. 15(1)(a).
89. Id. art. 15(1)(b).
90. Id. art. 15(1)(c).
91. Id. art. 15(1)(d).
92. Id. art. 15(2).
93. Free Zone Regulations, supra note 85, Regulation 5(2).
94. FZA, supra note 1, art. 16(1)(a).
95. Id. art. 16(1)(b).
96. Id. art. 12(1)(a).
97. Id. art. 12(1)(b).
98. Id. art. 16(2)(a).
99. Id. art. 16(2)(b).
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has breached any conditions attached to its grant." ° However, before revocation the
Board is obliged to give fourteen days working notice of its intentions to the licensee.
The Board is also under the obligation to consider any representations made to it by
the licencee in respect of a decision to revoke its licence."t '
The licencing provisions do not confer any specific rights on interested private
third parties to challenge the activities of developers and enterprises in the free zone.
Although the Regulations state that developer's should comply with environmental
regulations 2 there is no provision, for example, for intervention by local environ-
mental or developmental groups concerned about the impact of increased economic
activity created by the establishment of a free zone.' 03 The absence of private third-
party rights to question decisions of the Board is probably designed to give as much
scope as possible to market forces to determine the outcome of applications for zone
licences.
V. INCENTIVES
The FZA sets out a framework for the provision of incentives'04 to developers
and enterprises. First, developers and enterprises are not obliged to invest a minimum
sum of money as a prerequisite for participation in a zone. A second incentive is that
zone developers and enterprises granted licenses are exempted from paying income
tax on profits for the first ten years from the date of commencement of operations0 5
and, thereafter, the FZA provides that the level of income tax payable shall not
exceed eight percent.' °6 Shareholders are also exempted from paying withholding
taxes on dividends arising out of free zone investments.1re
100. Id. art. 18(l).
101. Id. art. 18(3). The Free Zone Regulations also set out provisions on the revocation of licenses. Free Zone
Regulations, supra note 85, Regulation 14(1) & (2).
102. Free Zone Regulations, supra note 85, Regulation 8.
103. The Board however can co-opt anyone to attend any of its meetings except that such persons do not have
the right to vote, FZA, supra note 1, art. 5(5). Further, under Article 6 the Board can set up a committee made up
wholly or in part of non-members to assist it in its functions. Id.
104. The Feasibility Report admits that "incentives can never be considered a substitute or compensation for
any deficiency in the investment climate or infrastructure. If the transport services or bureaucracy are such that it
is difficult for an investor to operate profitably an additional 5 years tax holiday will not compensate. Financial
assistance in the form of capital grants will only compensate in a small way for higher transport or other operating
costs. Incentives make a difference only where an investor is comparing the situation in two locations where he
can operate profitably." "An investor with a major capital intensive project which will not reach break even point
for 3 or 4 years will usually prefer assistance in financing the project (low interest loans or cash grants) to tax
holidays. For producers with very low capital costs and the prospects of immediate profitability, tax holidays are
usually preferred." Most free zone investors fall to the latter category and would normally prefer tax holidays to
other forms of financial assistance or incentives. See FEAsmrrY REPORT, supra note 2, at 33.
105. FZA, supra note 1, art. 28(1).
106. Id. art. 28(2).
107. Id. art. 28(3).
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In addition to the general incentives, the FZA provides special incentives for
foreign investors. A foreign investor in a zone may take and hold a maximum of 100
percent of the shares in any free zone enterprise, °8 and cannot be treated less
favorably than domestic enterprises that operate in any established zone.' 9 Foreign
investors are also guaranteed unconditional transfer through any authorized dealer
bank in free convertible currency of any dividends or net profits attributable to
investments they make;"0 payments in respect of loans servicing where a foreign
loan has been obtained;"' fees and charges in respect of any technology transfer
agreement;' 12 and the remittance of proceeds (net of all taxes and other obligations)
in the event of sale or liquidation of the enterprise or any interest attributable to the
investment." 
3
What could be described as another incentive to invest in the free zones, is that
zone enterprises cannot be nationalized or expropriated by the Government.' 4 Fur-
ther, no person who owns, whether wholly or in part, the capital of an enterprise can
be compelled by law to cede his interest in the capital to any other person."
5
However, if the State wishes to acquire any enterprise in the zone the acquisition is
valid under the FZA only when it is in the national interest, or the acquisition is for
a public purpose." 6 In pursuance of such an acquisition, the State is obliged to enact
specific legislation that makes provision for the payment of fair and adequate com-
pensation.' " The FZA also provides a right of access to the High Court for the
determination of the investor's interest or right amount of compensation to which the
investor is entitled" 8
VI. THE FRAMEWORK FOR EXPORTS AND IMPORTS
First, the provisions of the IFZAD that gave the Comptroller of Customs (the
Comptroller) wide powers to regulate the movement of goods in and out of the
proposed industrial free zones have been diluted. Under the IFZAD, the Comptroller
was obliged to examine all goods imported into or exported from a free zone to
108. Id. art. 29(1).
109. Id. art. 29(3).
110. Id. art. 30(a).
111. Id. art. 30(b).
112. Id. art. 30(c).
113. Id. art. 30(d).
114. Id. art. 31(1).
115. Id. art. 31(1). In the past, Ghana had failed to repatriate foreign capital involved in its expropriation of
foreign assets. However, the government has decided to repatriate blocked capital and dividend arrears due to
foreign private investors. Payments are now being made on a "first-in, first-out" basis with the total amount
involved estimated at $43 million. See Paul, Private SectorAssessment, supra note 6, at 27.
116. FZA, supra note 1, art. 31(2).
117. Id. art. 31(2)(a).
118. Id. art. 31(2)(b).
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ensure compliance with the conditions prescribed by the Authority for import or
export.119
Second, the Authority in consultation with the Comptroller was empowered to
prohibit or restrict the import into the industrial zones of goods or classes of goods
as it may determine." Third, all scheduled materials imported by an approved com-
pany for the manufacture of goods were to be stored in a bonded warehouse in a free
zone. These goods could not be delivered to the company unless such materials were
required for the manufacture of those goods.
The FZA eases restrictions on the imports and exports in and out of a free zone.
It provides that the laws in force in Ghana that regulate the import and export of
goods and services (other than consumer goods for commercial purposes) do not
apply to the import of goods directly from a country outside Ghana into a free zone.
Further, such laws do not apply to the dispatch of goods for export out of a free zone
to a country outside Ghana, except when they are made applicable by regulations
made under the FZA.12
In addition, imports by a free zone developer, sub-contractor or enterprise into
a free zone or single factory zone are not to be subjected to direct and indirect
taxes." In addition, the following powers that were vested in the Comptroller under
the IFZAD are not granted to the Minister under the FZA: the power to prevent the
export of goods from an industrial free zone unless the Comptroller has issued a
certificate of origin in respect of such goods;" the power to determine whether im-
ports or exports into a zone conformed to standards prescribed by the Authority;
125
and the power, in consultation with the Comptroller, to prohibit or restrict the import
of any goods or classes of goods as it may determine.12
However, the FZA does give the Minister certain functions aimed at promoting
linkages between the zone and the host country. Zone-domestic market linkages are
only a recent development, but the situation has changed in recent years. For a
number of reasons zone-host country linkages have become an important facet of the
free zone concept. First, some investors are now selecting free zone sites as pro-
duction bases to serve regional markets. In such circumstances it is necessary that
investors can service the domestic market as part of a wider regional market. Other
considerations are the need to dispose of second quality merchandise which cannot
be sold internationally; it is preferable to import a product from a free zone and leave
some added value in the country than to import from a third country; and permitting
119. IFZAD, supra note 3, art. 29(l).
120. Id. art. 30(1).
121. Id. art. 31(1).
122. FZA, supra note 1, art. 21(1)(a)(b).
123. Id. art. 22(1).
124. IFZAD, supra note 3, art. 28(1).
125. Id. art. 29.
126. Id. art. 30(1).
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domestic market sales allows for fair competition with sales from free zone enter-
prises from third countries.' 27
Consistent with this role of promoting zone-domestic market linkages, the
Minister has the authority to instruct enterprises in free zones to sell, annually, up to
30 percent of goods. Such sales are deemed to be imports into Ghana and accor-
dingly are subject to the rules and regulations that directly impact on imports into the
Ghana customs territory. 29 The FZA allows for sales from the domestic market to
the free zone.130 Domestic enterprises exporting goods and services to a free zone are
eligible to benefit from export incentives available to national exporters.'
Under the FZA the Customs Excise and Preventive Service (CEPS) is respon-
sible for the control of zero-rated goods within a free zone, in transit between two
free zones and in transit between a free zone and a point of entry into or exit out of
Ghana. 32 After consultation with the Minister responsible for Customs and Excise
and the Commissioner of CEPS, the Minister for Trade and Industry may make regu-
lations adopting or modifying any of the regulations that govern customs operations.
The Minister for Trade and Industry can regulate the movements of persons, vehicles
or goods into and out of a free zone, from and out to other parts of the national
customs territory. Further powers of this Minister extend to making regulations for
keeping, storing and handling goods in a free zones. The Commissioner of CEPS for
his part, has the power to make regulations that cover keeping and preservation of
accounts and records in respect of goods in a free zone, and regulations that provide
security, by bond or otherwise, on goods in transit between free zones and points of
entry and exit to other countries. 33
VII. EMPLOYMENT ISSUES
Zone developers and enterprises are free to negotiate and establish contracts of
employment with their employees. Such contracts are to be consistent with Inter-
national Labour Organization Conventions (ILO) on workers rights and conditions
of service 34 Furthermore, except as otherwise provided for by law, the rules and
regulations on workers rights and condition of service in respect of social security
and pensions, workmen's compensation, public holidays and ILO Conventions to
127. See FEASIBILITY REPORT, supra note 2, at 58.
128. FZA, supra note 1, art. 23(1). However, damaged or rejected goods or samples may be sold by the firms
from the zones into Ghana and such goods shall be considered as part of the 30% of annual production such firms.
Id. art. 24(3).
129. Id. art. 23(2). For measures directly affecting imports into Ghana, see TRADE POLICY REVIEW, supra
note 5, at 54-82.
130. FZA, supra note 1, art. 24(1).
131. Id. art. 24(2).
132. Id. art. 26(l)(a)-(c).
133. Id. art. 26(2)(a)-(e).
134. Id. art. 34(l).
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which Ghana is a party, do apply to domestic employees of a free zone developer and
enterprise.'35 One issue that arises here is the ambiguity of the words "shall be free"
with regard to contracts of employment. Is this to be construed to mean that zone
developers and enterprises may, only if they so wish, enter into formal contracts of
employment that are consistent with ILO Conventions, but may not be compelled to
do so? As observed above, one of the main benefits of establishing free economic
zones is the relocation of production from developed to developing countries with
the hope of exploiting the low cost of labor; a cost that surely would include
comparatively less strict labor legislation and enforcement. Thus, the wording of this
provision provides a possible loophole for zone enterprises and developers to fully
capitalize on the low cost of labor that the free zone concept is supposed to provide
with its consequent possible exploitation of workers in the free zones.
Although the low cost of labor might be one reason for firms to establish
themselves in a zone, it is important to note that low wages in themselves may not
be sufficient to induce foreign firms to do so. Low wages must be coupled with a
highly skilled labor force capable of reasonably high productivity.'36 Article 17(1)
of the FZA and the Regulation 34(1) of the Regulations acknowledge the importance
of the quality of the labor force. As recounted above, Article 17(1) empowers the
Board to attach certain social obligations to the grant of licenses. In a similar vein the
Regulations bind free zone employers to spend at least an additional one per cent of
their total wage and salary bill (excluding overtime pay, allowances and bonuses)
toward the training of their employees from their country. t37 In this latter instance
zone, employers are to furnish the Board with their training programs and records
every six months from the commencement of their operations in the zone.'38
The Board plays a role in securing work and resident permits for foreign
employees and, ostensibly, this provision could probably help to cut any red tape and
bureaucratic delays that might be associated with the normal immigration channels.
Article 34(3) of the FZA states that applications for work and resident permits should
be submitted in the first instance to the Board, and the Board is to take the necessary
action in consultation with the Immigration Service.
39
135. Free Zone Regulations, supra note 85, Regulation 33. The following laws have implications for the
rights of worker's in Ghana: Trade Union Ordinance, 1941; Conspiracy & Protection of Property (Trade Disputes)
Ordinance 1941; Trade Disputes (Arbitration & Inquiry) Ordinance, 1941; Industrial Relations Act, 1958; Industrial
Relations Act 1965; Labour Decree 1967 (NLC Decree 157); Labour Regulations 1969 (LI 632); Factories Offices
and Shops Act 1970, (Act 328) and PNDC Law 66 which amends it; and Workmen Compensation Law 1987
(PNDC Law 187). See FEAStBnrtY REPORT, supra note 2, at 19.
136. See UNCrAD, WORLD INvEsTMENT REPORt, supra note 38, at 206.
137. Free Zone Regulations, supra note 85, Regulation 34(1).
138. Id. Regulation 34(2).
139. FZA, supra note 1, art. 34(3). Under the Aliens Act, 1963, (Act 160) art. 10(1)-(3), an alien can be
employed in Ghana if a licence is obtained from the Minister of Interior. A licence granted by the Minister is to
specify the number of persons of a specified description authorized to be employed thereby and may specify
different numbers for different classes of employees. When an alien commences work for an employer under the
Act the employer shall, not later than seven days thereafter give notice to the Minister with a letter of guarantee in
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However, it is not certain whether this provision will speed up applications for
work and resident permits. Involving the Board in this process seemingly adds
another layer of bureaucracy to securing work and resident permits for foreign
nationals. On the other hand, if in its practice the Board, in conjunction with the
Immigration Service, adopts a liberal interpretation of Article 34(3) this could speed
up the processing of work and resident permits. This is because Article 34(3) appears
to give the Board the prime responsibility for dealing with work and resident permits
for foreign employees. It is only after applications have been submitted to the Board
that it is to take action in consultation with the Immigration Service. It is not certain
if this provision means that the Board need not necessarily be bound by the results
of its consultation with the Immigration Service. Nonetheless, in order to expedite
the functioning of the free zones the Board should, unless otherwise restrained,
interpret this provision to mean that it is to play the leading role in the consideration
and approval of work and resident permits for non-Ghanaian zone workers.
VIII. DISPUTE RESOLUTION
As recounted earlier, under the provisions guaranteeing against arbitrary
expropriation, zone licensees have the right of access to the High Court for the
determination of the investor's interest or amount of compensation to which he is
entitled.' 40 Additionally, where a dispute arises between a licensee in a free zone and
the Government in respect of any activities in the zone, all efforts shall be made
through mutual discussion to reach an amicable settlement.41 If the parties fail to
reach a friendly settlement, then the aggrieved party has the option to submit the
dispute for arbitration. 142 Arbitration can be in accordance with the rules of procedure
for arbitration of the United Nations Commission of International Trade Law. 43
In the case of a dispute involving a foreign investor there are special provisions.
First, the dispute can be resolved within the framework of any bilateral or multi-
lateral agreement on investment protection to which the Ghanaian Government and
the country of the investor are parties.144 It can also be resolved in accordance with
any other national or international machinery for the settlement of investment
disputes agreed to by the parties. '45 Furthermore, underpinning all the provisions on
dispute resolution is that in the event of a disagreement between a licensee and the
Government as to the method of dispute settlement to be adopted, the choice of the
licensee shall prevail.' 46
the prescribed form in respect of the repatriation expenses of the alien.
140. FZA, supra note 1, art. 31(2)(a)-(b).
141. Id. art. 32(1).
142. Id. art. 32(2).
143. Id. art. 32(2)(a).
144. Id. art. 32(2)(b).
145. Id. art. 32(2)(c).
146. Id. art. 32(3).
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However, the FZA only makes provision for disputes between the Government
on the one hand and licensees on the other. It remains silent on the possibility of a
dispute between two economic operators in a zone. In the event of an inter-licensee
dispute, it is not certain what the procedure for its resolution of disputes will be. It
is not clear from the FZA if the parties to a dispute will be compelled to resort to
efforts to reach an amicable settlement or whether they can circumvent this provision
and utilize the procedures established for licensee-Government disputes.
IX. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE POLICY ISSUES
The concept of a special economic zone in Ghana has changed radically since the
IFZAD was issued in 1978. A new approach to economic development has neces-
sitated a change in the law in order to facilitate the establishment of free zones with
a wider range of permitted economic activity. The result of this change has been a
reduction in state regulation on the movement of goods to and from zones, a reform
of the administrative arm so as to permit private sector participation, changes to the
provision of incentives, investor-friendly dispute-settlement procedures, and a
reduction in the risk of arbitrary expropriation.
However, these changes have created certain policy issues that need to be
discussed with the aim of improving the impact that the FZA could have on Ghana's
economic development. The preface to the suggested reforms to the FZA examined
below is that discussion of any new policy initiatives should not be the exclusive
preserve of Ghanaian legislators and other policy-makers. Zone developers and enter-
prises should make representations for amendments to the FZA, and they should also
participate fully in any review of the provisions that arise.
The following can form part of the discussions on how to improve the effect of
the FZA on Ghana's economic development. One important issue that needs to be
examined is why, as noted in the Trade Policy Review, no industrial free zones were
ever established under the IFZAD.t47 The questions that need to be asked of the
policy-makers in connection with this are as follows: was it the lack of awareness of
the existence of the IFZAD that caused this? Or, did the lack of incentives for the
participation by both domestic and foreign enterprises in the decision-making process
under the IFZAD cause it to fail as a policy tool? The answers to questions such as
these may contribute to the success of the FZA.
Second, the process of decision-making by the Board could be changed so as to
include, as of right, input by representatives of zone enterprises and developers. The
FZA does mention private sector participation but, it does not specifically state that
representatives of zone enterprises and developers should be on the Board. Repre-
sentatives of zone enterprises and developers should have been allowed to participate
directly in the deliberations of the Board by the designation for them of one of the
147. See TRADE POLICY REvEW, supra note 5, at 81.
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seats reserved for the private sector. Or, alternatively, they can be incorporated into
the decision-making process by the sum total of all enterprises and developers acting
in a consultative and/or advisory role through a Body set up for this purpose. In this
regard, before any major decisions are taken that have direct implications for
economic activity in a zone, there should be a binding obligation on the Board to
consult this proposed Body. The Board would determine whether to act on any
recommendations.
Another issue is the need for accountability mechanisms to regulate the activities
of enterprises and developers in the zones. Notwithstanding the fact that the purpose
of the FZA is to create areas of economic activity with a much reduced level of
government intervention, this does not necessarily mean that economic activity can
be pursued by zone developers and enterprises absolutely free of any form of
accountability. If developers and enterprises are to take advantage of the benefits of
operating in a free zone, then the public at large should be well-informed about the
value that it receives for its expenditure and/or loss of tax revenue. Moreover, the
general public should have some meaningful role to play in the decision-making
process. Thus, with regard to the obligation on developers to comply with any
environmental standards, there should be procedures established for any inquiries by
the Board, zone developers, zone enterprises, or any concerned citizens group
regarding the levels of environmental compliance.
Related to this point is the failure of the FZA to attach importance to the role of
local community institutions in the success of the free zones program. Disparate eco-
nomic growth between a free economic zone and its neighboring areas can result in
social problems. These social problems can easily be made worse by the presence of
foreign corporations, managers and technicians in a zone.1 48 The Feasibility Report
acknowledges this by noting that local influences should be supportive of the
establishment of zones. Adjoining communities not in agreement with a proposed
development could seriously hinder an otherwise ideal location through vexatious
and frivolous development objections, causing delays, or contributing to an unac-
ceptable level of vandalism. 49 Therefore, the Board should design a framework for
effective participation by local institutions to enhance the success of the program.
Another consideration with regard to the social obligations of free zone em-
ployers is with the training of employees under Regulation 34(1). Although this
Regulation is a progressive measure, it has its limitations as zone employers are only
obliged to train employees that are only from their own country. However, if Ghana
is to benefit from the presence of foreign firms in the free zones, this Regulation
should be amended so as to apply to all workers without necessarily amending the
percentage of the total wage and salary bill that Regulation 34(1) obliges employers
to spend on training.
148. See Amnado, Free Industrial Zones, supra note 33, at 122-23.
149. See FEASIBILITY REPORT, supra note 2, at 64-65.
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The fourth policy issue is with regard to the possible role of Ghana's metro-
politan governments in the location of zones. As a result of the centralization of the
decision-making process, urban government has no authority to establish zones.
Decentralization of the power to establish zones can maximize efficiency in deter-
mination of feasibility of a designated area because it will help to avoid over-
centralized bureaucracies which often issue policy with little relevance to local
realities. Second, decentralization can also empower local-level agencies, which are
more sensitive to local conditions and needs, to make decisions that are in accord
with such sensitivities. Thus, policy-makers should explore measures by which
metropolitan authorities can participate in decisions taken to establish free zones in
areas under their jurisdiction, or establish free zones subject to the approval process
under Article 7(l)(a)-(b).
Moreover, the FZA is silent on the factors to be taken into account in arriving at
a decision to establish a free zone. The relevant provisions of the FZA only state that
the Board is to grant licenses to applicants under the Act.150 By failing to outline the
importance of commercial benefits as the underlying rationale for the grant of free
zone status, the FZA leaves the door open for the Board to rely on its discretion. Here
the Board could succumb to public pressure and lobbying to grant zone status based
on non-commercial factors instead of stressing commercial advantage as the prime
consideration. To avoid this possibility, the Board should draw up a code that would
serve as a definitive reference for decisions it makes, giving commercial factors
precedence over any other consideration in the grant of licenses.
In addition, with regard to the grant or revocation of licenses, the Board, through
its practice, should expand upon its obligations under Article 18 and Regulation
6(2)(b). Merely repeating the reasons for the revocation or grant of licenses without
a detailed explanation of the grounds will make it difficult for potential applicants to
evaluate their chances for successful future applications. It will also make it harder
for zone developers and enterprises to fully understand why their licenses have been
revoked.-
Accordingly, Board conclusions should be made available to all affected parties
and to the general public. Information in this respect should contain all the relevant
determinations made by the Board in reaching its decisions. Decisions that are made
public will provide an accessible description of the standards the Board applies to its
decisions. This will assure broader knowledge of its actions and will serve as a basis
for measuring consistency in its policies. In addition, the existence of published
policies will save time for the staff of the Secretariat because applicants and other
interested parties will not have to rely on the staff for descriptions of positions and
policies.
150. FZA, supra note 1, art. 3(1)(a).
151. See Howard N. Fenton 1I, A New Era for Administration and Judicial Review of Foreign Trade Zones
Board Decisions, 4 MW'N. J. GLOBAL TRADE 223,266-68 (1995) (demonstrating examples on this point).
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Furthermore, avenues for the continuous strengthening of the administrative
capacity of the Board should also be explored. In this way, the Board could be
allowed to keep a percentage of the duty raised from the sale to the national customs
territory of goods or services produced in the zone. Income raised in this manner
could be used, for example, to train staff on the Board's Secretariat, or for further
incentives to developers and enterprises in the form of assistance with start-up costs,
or grants for job training.
The effectiveness of tax incentives to induce foreign firms in particular to locate
in the free zones is beyond the scope of this paper. However, the provision of tax
incentives under the FZA to enterprises located in the zones should be reviewed. The
question should be whether firms can receive tax incentives permanently or whether
any financial inducements should be linked to minimum performance requirements?
Discussion of the future of the tax incentives provisions of the FZA should center
around the role that they are to play. The crucial question here should be are tax
incentives provided to encourage efficient firms to locate in, and operate out of, the
zones, or are they to be granted to all firms including those that are economically
inefficient with the hope that such firms can stimulate their operations through the
incentives? My argument here is that only enterprises that can show profitability and
thus some contribution to the development of the Ghanaian economy should be the
beneficiaries of continuing tax incentives. Thus the provision of tax incentives should
be closely monitored. The possibility of requiring that a firm operate in the zone for
a minimum number of years or else all tax concessions that have accrued to it should
be repaid could also be considered.
The FZA does not mention the importance of promoting the zones. This is a flaw
that must be remedied through the imposition of a duty on the Board to promote the
program abroad. It is argued that most zones that have done badly have failed to
understand that promotion is an important task.52 The Feasibility Report acknow-
ledges promotion as being crucial to the success of the zones especially in the early
years of the program. The Report thus recommended that an organization be given
the responsibility for promoting the zones in Ghana.1
53
The Feasibility Report also advocated the establishment of overseas repre-
sentation either through the zone authority maintaining its own offices abroad, or the
zone authority could perform this function in conjunction with some suitable
Ghanaian Overseas Agency, or promotion could be done by appointing agents
abroad.154 Hence, the Board will have to address the issue on its own initiative by
researching approaches to promotion of the zones locally and on the international
market.
152. See UNCTC, THE CHALLENGE OF FREE ECONOMIC ZONES, supra note 21, at 273.
153. FEAsmIrIY REPORT, supra note 2, at 45. The Feasibility Report suggested that either the Ghana Invest-
ment Promotion Centre or the free zones Corporation (that it recommended) be charged with the task of promoting
the zones in Ghana. Id.
154. Id. at46.
1997/The Ghana Free Zone Act
The duty on zone developers to provide the necessary infrastructure is another
shortcoming of the FZA. Physical infrastructure is a necessary condition for the
success of the free zone concept. If a zone is well equipped with reliable energy and
water supplies, together with local and international high communication networks,
then the initial outlays required from investors fall considerably. As a result, in-
dustries can commence operations more rapidly, and there are earlier returns on
capital. This shortcoming of the FZA is made more apparent when the opinions of
the drafters of the Feasibility Report are considered. It was noted in the Feasibility
Report that reliable infrastructure including water supply sewerage/drainage services,
electricity and a good and efficient road and transport network is essential.155 It is
thus important to note here that private developers may not have the necessary
resources to undertake the construction of infrastructure which is vital to the zones'
success. What should be discussed therefore is the role that the State or the Board
should play in the provision of infrastructure that is necessary for efficient business
activities in the zones.
A final policy issue for future discussion is whether it is appropriate to link the
zones to the domestic market by a Ministerial fiat, i.e. the Minister for Trade and
Industry's power to compel enterprises to sell a percentage of their products to the
domestic market. Although the rationale behind zone-domestic market linkages
might be sound, it might be prudent economic policy for market forces to determine
the degree of zone-host economy sales. The Feasibility Report acknowledges this by
stating that the ideal situation here would be for the market rather than regulation to
determine the level of zone-domestic market sales.56
155. Id. at 64.
156. Id at 59.
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